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Abstract This paper argues that feelings of agency are linked to human well-being
through a sequence of adaptive mechanisms that promote human development, once
existential conditions become permissive. In the ﬁrst part, we elaborate on the evolutionary
logic of this model and outline why an evolutionary perspective is helpful to understand
changes in values that give feelings of agency greater weight in shaping human well-being.
In the second part, we test the key links in this model with data from the World Values
Surveys using ecological regressions and multi-level models, covering some 80 societies
worldwide. Empirically, we demonstrate evidence for the following sequence: (1) in
response to widening opportunities of life, people place stronger emphasis on emancipative
values, (2) in response to a stronger emphasis on emancipative values, feelings of agency
gain greater weight in shaping people’s life satisfaction, (3) in response to a greater impact
of agency feelings on life satisfaction, the level of life satisfaction itself rises. Further
analyses show that this model is culturally universal because taking into account the
strength of a society’s western tradition does not render insigniﬁcant these adaptive
linkages. Precisely because of its universality, this is indeed a ‘human’ development model
in a most general sense.
Keywords Agency feelings  Cultural evolution  Emancipative values 
Human development  Knowledge economies  Life satisfaction  Well-being
1 Introduction
This paper claims that people can and do change their strategies to maximize happiness
and that changes in value priorities are an inherent part of this process. Furthermore, we
C. Welzel (&)
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH,
Campus Ring 1, Research IV, Room 62 a/b, 28759 Bremen, Germany
e-mail: cwelzel@gmail.com
R. Inglehart
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
123
Soc Indic Res (2010) 97:43–63
DOI 10.1007/s11205-009-9557-zclaim that in order to understand the logic of these changes, one has to start from an
evolutionary model of social change (Nolan and Lenski 1999; Carneiro 2003; Boyd and
Richardson 2005). An evolutionary model recognizes that people adapt their maximization
strategies in response to the shifting needs and opportunities of life (Parsons 1964; Dunbar
et al. 1999). When these needs and opportunities shift in the same way for many people,
this nurtures similar adaptation strategies. Similar strategies accumulate to collective
trends, which is social change. Social change of this accumulative type is evolutionary in
the sense that it is self-driven: it needs no central coordinator with a master plan to merge
the adaptations of many people into a collective trend when the ‘invisible hand’ of the
adaptive logic does the job (Axelrod 1986; Coleman 1990).
Evolutionary dynamics always favor what is most adaptive under given circumstances
(Durham 1991). Both human individuals and societies are adaptive when they command
two types of capabilities: (a) the capability to meet the needs that have to be met in order to
survive; and (b) the capability to take the opportunities that have to be taken in order to
thrive. Among individuals as well as societies, the imperative of adaptability puts a pre-
mium on ‘agency.’ Greater agency involves higher adaptability because for individuals as
well as societies, agency means the power to act purposely to their advantage (Bakan 1966;
McAdams 1993; Guisinger and Blatt 1994). As Birch and Cobb (1981) outline in The
Liberation of Life, one can see the evolutionary trend to increase agency both in the
biological evolution of organisms and in the social evolution of civilization. Life evolved
from lower to higher organized organisms and this was a move from low agency, as in
microbes and insects, to high agency as in primates and above all humans, with the latter
being more empowered to act purposely to their advantage than any other species on earth.
Civilizations, too, evolved from technologically less to technologically more empowered
societies, in a sequence from hunter-gatherer to agrarian to industrial to postindustrial
societies, with the latter exerting the most power over their environments (Elias 2004
[1984]; Nolan and Lenski 1999).
In the evolution of life, agency became most advanced in human beings as the species
with the highest intellectual power to act with purpose on this planet. As an evolutionary
shaped capacity, agency is a particularly ‘human’ capacity. It is indeed a deﬁning char-
acteristic of our species (Maryanski and Turner 1992). ‘Human’ development is hence any
development that promotes the most human trait—agency (Sen 1999). In the life course of
individuals, human development is the maturation of a person’s agentic traits. Applying the
same logic to the trajectory of societies, all changes that bring a larger number of people in
the situation to more fully realize their agentic traits, is to be characterized as ‘human’
development (Welzel et al. 2003).
As we will try to show, variation in life strategies within and between societies reﬂect
evolutionary adaptations to changing living conditions in ways that favor agency and
hence, human development. And as we will see, as an evolutionary shaped trait, agency is
anchored in the human motivational system in that greater feelings of agency yield higher
life satisfaction. The rootedness of agency in the human motivational system is, as we
claim, the key driver of human development. Yet, the way in which agency is rooted in the
human motivational system also explains why human development does often not proceed.
The key reason lies in the fact that the weight with which feelings of agency impact on
human life satisfaction varies with the character of life. When life is a constant threat to
suffer, people place less emphasis on agency; only when life becomes an opportunity to
thrive, do people begin to value agency very highly. From a different conceptual angle and
with different methodology, the ﬁndings of Delhey (2010) on ‘‘postmaterialist happiness’’
point to the same conclusion as ours.
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perspective is helpful to understand social change. Speciﬁcally, this applies to changes in
values that give feelings of agency greater weight in shaping human well-being. In the
second part, we test the key links in this model with data from the World Values Surveys
using ecological regressions and multi-level models, covering some 80 societies world-
wide. Empirically, we demonstrate evidence for the following sequence: (1) in response to
widening opportunities of life, people place stronger emphasis on emancipative values, (2)
in response to a stronger emphasis on emancipative values, feelings of agency gain greater
weight in shaping people’s life satisfaction, (3) in response to a greater impact of agency
feelings on life satisfaction, the level of life satisfaction itself rises. Further analyses show
that this model is culturally universal because taking into account the strength of a soci-
ety’s western tradition does not render insigniﬁcant these adaptive linkages. Precisely
because of its universality, this is indeed a ‘human’ development model in a most general
sense.
2 Theory
Like everything that is part of life, human societies develop under the evolutionary
imperative to adapt to the conditions of their environment. Otherwise they are not viable
(Parsons 1964; Elias (2004 [1984]); Nolan and Lenski 1999; Diamond 2005; Barber 2008).
Human societies operate under adaptive pressures as regards the patterns of (a) how they
organize themselves and (b) how they orientate themselves (Dunbar et al. 1999). The ﬁrst
aspect relates to structural adaptability, the second to cultural adaptability. By means of
historical experiments, some societies might have found patterns of organization and
orientation that are better for a society to master given needs and opportunities, making
these societies thriving. This creates social models that, once they are recognized as such,
tend to diffuse among societies. At some point in history, each society makes distinct
choices about which model to adopt. ‘Evolutionary universals’ (Parsons 1964) such as state
bureaucracy, market capitalism, the welfare state and electoral democracy diffused in the
past because the elites of societies recognized these as social models and deliberately chose
to adopt them because of their utility (Modelski and Gardner 2002; Meyer et al. 1997). The
Prussian Reforms of 1811–1813, the Meiji-Period in Japan and the numerous examples
when countries change their political regime or economic order fall into this category.
Social evolution proceeds at different levels. One is the level of societies themselves.
Here evolution proceeds through historical sequences of collective choices exacted by
societal elites. This includes choices about wars, international alliances, political regimes,
economic orders, and policy programs. But the imperatives of adaptation operate also on
the micro level of individual human beings. Their capacities to exert agency enable them to
make choices about what to maximize in their lives. Because these choices are not fully
predetermined, they differ. Differences manifest variation in human maximization strate-
gies. Variation in a pool of strategies establishes a ﬁeld of experimentation that ﬁlters out
what is more useful under what conditions. Among perceptive agents this makes learning
possible, allowing individuals to chose the strategies they perceive as most useful. When
many such micro-level choices are similar, they create a macro-level trend that changes
entire societies (Boyd and Richardson 2005).
Quite logically, when maximization strategies change, the values that legitimize and
inspire these strategies change with them. Value change can hence be described as an
evolutionary process that follows Coleman’s (1990) ‘bath tub model’: similar choices at
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instance, explains changes in societal norms using this adaptive evolutionary logic. And
Elias (2004 [1984]) holds that when processes are clearly directed, even though they are
neither centrally planned nor coordinated, employing evolutionary logic is the only way to
understand such processes.
As an evolutionary process, value change involves humans as agents who make distinct
strategy choices. Agency, understood as the capacity to make purposeful choices, and the
learning potential connected to agency, catapult the evolutionary pace of human societies
on a new level, accelerating cultural evolution way beyond biological evolution (Elias
(2004 [1984]); Durham 1991; Carneiro 2003).
Most theories of value change, including Inglehart’s (1977, 1990) generational
replacement thesis, follow an evolutionary logic, even if they are not explicit about this.
This is true for three reasons. First, values are assumed to change in adaptation to changing
living conditions. In Inglehart’s thinking these are generational adaptations to changing
living conditions in people’s formative years. Second, the adaptation happens at the micro-
level and when many micro-level adaptations move in the same direction, they accumulate
to a macro-level trend. Third, these adaptations are not centrally planned or ‘socially
constructed’: no central actor controls them. It is the invisible-hand like logic of adaptation
that leads agents who are capable of choice to adopt similar strategies.
The function of values is to inspire maximization strategies that help agents to master
two things with which any environment confronts them: needs and opportunities. Meeting
needs is necessary to survive. Taking opportunities is helpful to thrive. Like anything that
is a property of living beings, values operate under the imperative to respond to the needs
and opportunities of their environment. Values inspire maximization strategies and dif-
ferent maximization strategies are differently useful in meeting needs and taking oppor-
tunities. Strategies that are not useful in meeting given needs are not viable. They are
deselected by the failure of the agents who apply them. With the non-viable strategies, the
values that inspire them are deselected too. Such negative selection does not require any
attempt at learning among the involved agents. It always works: anything that is not
reality-ﬁt is deselected by reality.
‘Negative’ selection always reduces the pool of existing life models to what is viable.
But even though all existing models in a given pool are viable by deﬁnition, some might be
more useful than others for thriving. Agents whose values inspire strategies that are more
useful in taking advantage from given opportunities will thrive more. They will be better
off, which will become manifest in recognizable signs of success. This sets the stage for
‘positive’ selection. Positive selection goes beyond deselecting the unviable but it only
works in a population of agents whose intellectual capacities empower them to learn from
observation and change their actions and strategies at own will. In a social setting, positive
selection operates via the markers of success that ﬂag out the thriving agents as role models
for others to emulate. Human societies are unique in their potential for positive selection
because they consist of agents who are particularly perceptive of social markers and who
have a unique ability to adopt at will what they see as a useful model (Boyd and Rich-
ardson 2005).
Still, people’s capacity of agency does by no means fully and freely unfold. Instead,
people’s agency is socially constrained in manifold ways. Humans grow up and live in
stratiﬁed societies. Stratiﬁcation is connected to the vested interests of the powerful. These
interests are never openly propagated but instead are wrapped into legitimizing ideologies
whose purpose is to make stratiﬁcation accepted, especially among those who are at the
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123lower end. These legitimizing ideologies are made credible and reproduced by another
powerful tool that delimits human agency: socialization.
Socialization denotes the processes through which humans are familiarized with what is
socially accepted in their society. Refusing to internalize these ‘lessons’ is socially sanc-
tioned in manifold ways. These sanctions are successful because humans have evolved as
social beings who are highly susceptible to group pressures (Tooby and Cosmides 2005).
1
Accordingly, humans internalize most of their values fully unconsciously in an unques-
tioned process of socialization.
2 Values are powerful regulators of human behavior because
they are part of people’s self-construal and identity. The personality aspect of values
further limits humans’ capacity to freely change and adjust their values (Kluckhohn 1951;
Rokeach 1968; Schwartz 2007).
Not enough with that, stratiﬁcation limits the horizon within which human agents look
for useful role models. A peasant in a feudal society simply does not consider a knight as
her/his role model because what the knight can achieve is beyond the peasant’s perceived
reach. More generally, stratiﬁcation locks humans into separated reference groups. The
more rigid stratiﬁcation is, the more is social learning, role model diffusion, and positive
selection bound within narrow reference groups.
All this means that value change is not coming about easily. Humans do not unnec-
essarily experiment with their values because experimentation is costly. It means breaking
with given conventions and this involves social sanctions. And yet, humans are not
deterministically programmed computers. Stratiﬁcation, socialization, and the encoding of
norms all work to reproduce a society’s evolved conﬁguration from one generation to the
next. And for that to be possible, the individual human agents’ capacities to change their
values at own will has to be caged (Elias 2004 [1984]; Maryanski and Turner 1992). Still,
as much as socialization ‘cages’ humans’ agentic capacities, it does not set them off. In
fact, when the environment changes so drastically that it poses new challenges or offers
new opportunities, and when the challenges question the viability of old strategies, or when
the old strategies are no longer useful to take advantage of the new opportunities, people’s
readiness to try out new strategies increases considerably. Experimentation will climb to
new levels. This is to happen most frequently among younger people because for them
experimentation is less costly (Flanagan 1987; Inglehart 1997). Having less of a lifetime
invested into old values and role models, they can more easily detach their identity from
traditional patterns. New lifestyles seek to create their own environment in which to thrive
and this creates new social milieus. If a variety of such milieus emerges, other people are
confronted with a greater variety of life models to choose from Flanagan and Lee (2001).
Since humans are perceptive agents and because there are recognizable social markers of
success, people will ﬁgure out which models are most useful in taking advantage of new
opportunities. Many people will then adopt the values inspiring these models, resulting in a
social diffusion of new values. If this happens, we observe an evolutionary change of
norms, as described by Axelrod (1986).
1 Responsiveness to conformity pressures can lead to the adoption of behavior that is socially adaptive
because it avoids sanctions but which is harmful for the well-being of the individual and even an entire
society. Societies whose conformity pressures cause harmful behavior are themselves maladaptive, which in
the extreme case can lead to their ‘‘Collapse’’ (Diamond 2005).
2 Often, people develop rational arguments to legitimize their values. But the values have not been chosen
on the basis of logical reasoning. Rather, rationality is constructed to justify a priori internalized values.
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Elaborating on a sequence of adaptations entailed in the human development model of
Welzel et al. (2003), Fig. 1 shows an evolutionary sequence of cultural change, involving
four adaptive links. These links are in a sequential order of ontological priority. First, there
is an environment-utility link through which given existential conditions deﬁne the
availability of opportunities to thrive. Existential conditions are all types of environmental
conditions, including not only natural conditions but also economic, social, and cultural
conditions. Consider for instance an economic condition: a society subsists as an agrarian
economy in which a large majority of the population is occupied in food production. Under
this condition, obtaining university-level education is not an easily available opportunity
for most people because agrarian societies do not provide extensive education. Even if an
individual manages to attain a university degree, this is not a very useful opportunity to
thrive in agrarian societies because there are few occupations for academically trained
people in these types of societies. Education is of limited utility under these circumstances.
Or consider a cultural condition: the norms of a society favor the male breadwinner model.
Obtaining professional training is of limited utility especially for women under this con-
dition. Even if they manage to receive professional training, lack of social acceptance of a
female breadwinner would severely limit what women could do with training. Finally,
consider a political condition: the denial of democratic freedoms, such as the right to vote
government out of ofﬁce. This restriction limits the utility of political information because,
if one cannot use information to cast a vote that counts, getting information is pretty
useless. There are many more examples of how economic, social, cultural and political
conditions set limits to opportunities and their utility for people to thrive.
The environment-utility link is followed by a utility-value link: people prioritize the
opportunities with the greatest utility in their society, so taking these opportunities
becomes a widely supported value. In an agrarian society, for example, land property is
valued. And when a society lacks an efﬁcient pension system so that having many children
provides an important opportunity to subsist in old age, fertility tends to be highly valued.
Next follows a value-strategy link: values inspire and legitimize certain maximization
strategies. When, for instance, a woman values a life model that favors a double role as
housewife and breadwinner, she is likely to adjust her maximization strategy accordingly.
Instead of maximizing the time used for childcare, she will also invest time to obtain
professional training.
Finally, there is a strategy-wellbeing link. Every strategy, if successfully realized, is a
source of satisfaction. However, we claim that the type of strategy has different satisfying
potential. Speciﬁcally, strategies that are targeted at unfolding agentic traits yield higher
levels of satisfaction because they actualize an agentic being’s inner traits. In a Maslowian
logic (Maslow 1988 [1954]), agency provides the highest level of satisfaction because it
meets the most uniquely human need, indeed the need of highest order in the evolution of
life: self-actualization (Veenhoven 2000; Haller and Hadler 2004; Baumeister et al. 2009).
Fig. 1 An evolutionary sequence of adaptive links explaining social change
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premium on agency because for an individual with greater agency more things become a
useful opportunity. Self-actualization is the most agentic end among all and one of the
‘tricks’ of evolution to favor agency is to attach the highest satisfaction yield to self-
actualization. Experimental evidence that self-actualization has indeed a high satisfaction
payoff is provided in the framework of self-determination theory by Deci and Ryan (2000).
Figure 2 speciﬁes a vicious and a virtuous pathway of this general sequence of adaptive
links, distinguishing them by how inhibitive or favorable they are to human growth,
unfolding, and development. Accordingly, the vicious pathway is labeled ‘‘human stag-
nation path’’ and the virtuous one is labeled ‘‘human development path.’’ They are mirror
images of each other.
Pressing existential conditions are found in societies on low levels of economic
development. Life in these societies is shorter and harder and offers people less oppor-
tunities to thrive. Indeed, under pressing conditions life is a constant risk to loose, which
makes life a constant source of threat perceptions. Threat perceptions lead people to search
for shelter under the shielding roof of authoritatively ordered group life. In this mode,
people value deference to group authority. Deferential values in turn inspire and legitimize
prevention strategies. This makes prevention of failure people’s chronic ‘regulatory focus’
in society.
3 If successfully realized, prevention strategies provide relaxation from exis-
tential pressures. This is a source of satisfaction but not a very powerful one, for relaxation
from pressure leaves the agentic need of actualizing oneself unsatisﬁed.
Economically advanced societies differ from economically less developed ones in
practically all aspects of life. Economically advanced societies are characterized by per-
missive existential conditions that offer the average person a longer and more exciting life
and manifold opportunities to thrive. To take advantage from these opportunities it is
helpful when people adopt agentic orientations and emancipate themselves from group
authority. Emancipative values in turn inspire and legitimize promotion strategies. If
successfully realized, promotion strategies provide feelings of fulﬁllment—the most
powerful source of satisfaction.
The key to make the lives of entire populations healthier, longer, richer and more
meaningful is economic development (Reinert 2007). The source of economic
Fig. 2 Vicious and virtuous versions of the evolutionary model of social change
3 The distinction between a prevention and a promotion focus in regulatory focus theory is usually applied
to variation in conditions between different short-term situations (Foerster et al. 1998). But the same logic
can be applied to variation in conditions between different long-term conditions.
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societies have to generate and deploy knowledge and this requires the mobilization of the
cognitive potential of the population on as broad a front as possible (Tofﬂer 1990; Drucker
1993; Florida 2002).
4 The need to mobilize cognitive potentials broadly makes discrimi-
natory group boundaries that bloc certain social groups from opportunities dysfunctional.
To get cognitive mobilization started, to keep it going, and to accelerate it, intellectual
freedom and equality of opportunities become prime requirements. Thus, cognitive
mobilization favors a type of orientation that emphasizes personal autonomy, equality of
opportunities, tolerance, and democratic participation. Hence, cognitive mobilization
should give rise to emancipative values that emphasize freedom of expression and equality
of opportunities. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Welzel (2006, 2007) introduced scales of
emancipative values that became known under the label ‘self-expression values’ because
freedom of expression is one of the core components of these values.
Because self-expression values emphasize personal autonomy, people who adopt these
values should ﬁnd the feeling of being agents in shaping their lives more important. And
when feelings of agency become more important in people’s life, these feelings should
obtain greater weight in shaping people’s life satisfaction. Finally, realizing one’s agency
potential brings more satisfaction than other satisfying strategies because actualized
agency leads to fulﬁllment—the most highly rewarded type of satisfaction among self-
aware, agentic beings.
3 Operationalization
3.1 Hypotheses
Based on these reﬂections, three hypotheses can be formulated, each one covers one of the
above described adaptive links:
1. There is a utility-values link that ties self-expression values to cognitive mobilization.
2. There is values-strategy link that ties agentic life strategies to self-expression values.
3. There is a strategy-wellbeing link that ties high levels of life satisfaction to agentic life
strategies.
3.2 Data and Measurements
Our hypotheses propose some rather universal claims that are supposed to operate inde-
pendent of the type of society under consideration. The very universality of these
4 There is no ultimately accepted deﬁnition of ‘cognitive mobilization’ but the most often used sources are
Inglehart’s Culture Shift (1990) and Dalton’s Citizen Politics (2006), both of which emphasize informational
resources and intellectual skills as the two components of cognitive mobilization. For example, Dalton
(2006:19) deﬁnes cognitive mobilization as a process through which more people acquire ‘‘the political
resources and skills that prepare them to deal with the complexities of politics and reach their own deci-
sions.’’ Political resources and skills are understood here as informational resources and intellectual skills.
The expansion of informational resources is related to the rise, spread, and reach of modern electronic mass
media and information technology, while the increase and spread of intellectual skills is linked to rising
levels of education and cognitive demands in modern occupations. The link to the core features of
knowledge societies is thus obvious. Understanding the complexities of politics can certainly be extended to
understanding the complexities of modern life in general and the term ‘‘reach their own decisions’’ makes
the connection to agency obvious.
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array of societies that has ever been covered with questions on values, feelings of agency,
and life satisfaction is provided by the European and World Values Surveys (henceforth:
Values Surveys-VS). The VS have ﬁelded a standardized questionnaire among nationally
representative samples of residents (sampling between 1,000 and 3,000 respondents per
country) in more than 90 societies on all inhabited continents, representing more than 90%
of the world population. We use pooled VS data from rounds III (1995–1999), IV (2000–
2001), and V (2005–2007), covering a roughly 10 year period from 1995 to 2005. Details
on questionnaire wording, ﬁeldwork organization and data access can be obtained at
www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
One part of our analytical strategy is to examine how culturally speciﬁc or universal the
linkagesweproposeare.Fromtheviewpointofculturalrelativism,onemightsuspectthatself-
expression values and feelings of agency are speciﬁcally western concepts that do not really
applytonon-westerncultures.Ifthiswereindeedtrue,thelinkagesweproposewouldnotwork
once one takes into account the strength of a society’s Western traditions. The question,
however,iswherethestrengthofawesternculturalheritagebecomesmostmanifest.Agreeing
with Huntington (1996), we think that one of the most distinct societal products of the west is
liberal democracy. The widely cited work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) supports this
view.Theconceptofliberaldemocracyhasbeeninventedandfurtherdevelopedinthewestand
existstherefor thelongesttime.Thisisespeciallyfor theProtestantWest,which,accordingto
MaxWeber,representsthewesternliberalspiritmostclearly.FromtheProtestantWest,liberal
democracy diffused into other regions in a sequence reﬂecting these regions’ closeness to the
west, moving to catholic countries and then to Far Eastern and African countries, being most
delayed until today in the Middle East.These cultural differences are perfectly reﬂected in the
length of time since a country has liberal democracy.
To measure the endurance of democracy, we use Gerring’s ‘democracy stock’ indicator
as of 1995 (Gerring et al. 2005). This variable adds up the democracy scores a society has
accumulated over time on the Polity IV autocracy-democracy index (Marshall and Jaggers
2000) but depreciates scores from past years by 1% for each year they are preceding the
reference year 1995. This index reﬂects a society’s accumulated experience with liberal
democracy with a premium on recent experience.
5 For the reasons just outlined, we
interpret the democracy stock variable as an indication of the strength of western traditions
in a society and label it accordingly.
To measure how advanced cognitive mobilization is in a society we use the World
Bank’s ‘‘knowledge index’’ (KI) as of 1995, which indicates ‘‘a society’s ability to gen-
erate, adopt and, diffuse knowledge. The KI is the simple average of the normalized scores
of a society on the key variables in the three knowledge economy pillars: education,
innovation, and ICT (World Bank 2008).’’ The knowledge index combines data on edu-
cation (using indicators like the tertiary enrollment ratio), on innovation (using indicators
like the number of patents per 10,000 inhabitants), and on information technology (using
indicators like the number of internet hosts per 1,000 inhabitants). We rescaled the index
into a range from 0 to 1.0, with higher values indicating a more advanced knowledge
economy. A description of index construction and data are available for download at:
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp. In the following analyses, we
label this variable ‘‘cognitive mobilization.’’
Self-expression values comprise a conglomerate of egalitarian, liberal, autonomous and
expressive orientations. These orientations cohere more as aggregate properties of
5 We thank John Gerring for his generosity in sharing his data with us.
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variance in theseorientationsbetween than within populations.FollowingWelzel (2007)w e
build a scale of self-expression values from VS data as shown in Table 1. The scale range is
from 0 for someone holding the least expressive position in each of the four component
orientations to 1.0 for someone holding the most expressive position in all of them.
Feelings of agency, often also called locus of control, are covered in the VS by question
number V46, which asks: ‘‘Some people feel they have completely free choice and control
overtheirlives,whileotherpeoplefeelthatwhattheydohasnorealeffectonwhathappensto
them. Please use this scale where 1 means ‘no choice at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal of
choice’ to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way
yourlifeturnsout.’’Werecodedresponsesintoanormalizedscalewitharangefrom0forthe
least agentic position to 1.0 for the most agentic position.
Life satisfaction is addressed by VS question number V22, which asks: ‘‘All things con-
sidered,howsatisﬁedareyouwithyourlifeasawholethesedays?Usingthiscardonwhich1
means you are ‘completely dissatisﬁed’ and 10 means you are ‘completely satisﬁed’ where
would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?’’ We normalized life satisfaction
into a scale range from 0 for the least satisﬁed position to 1.0 for the most satisﬁed one.
A huge and still growing literature on subjective wellbeing suggests that life satisfaction
is inﬂuenced by many factors and agency is only one of them (for overviews see
Veenhoven 2000; Lykken 2000; Diener et al. 2006).
6 Material factors, such as someone’s
actual income, but even more so a person’s subjective monetary saturation play also a role
(Diener and Oishi 2000; Inglehart et al. 2008). To include monetary saturation in our
consideration is theoretically intriguing because its materialist nature brings monetary
saturation into a stark contrast to agency feelings as a more idealistic source of satisfaction.
To measure subjective monetary saturation we use question number V68 of the VS, asking:
‘‘How satisﬁed are you with the ﬁnancial situation of your household? Please use this card
again to help with your answer.’’ The show card depicts a 1–10 scale which we trans-
formed into a normalized scale range from 0 for the least satisﬁed position to 1.0 for the
most satisﬁed one.
Another satisfying factor that is often brought into contrast to agency is ‘communion’
(Bakan 1966; McAdams 1993; Guisinger and Blatt 1994). Thus, we test the possibility that
agentic life strategies and communal life strategies are contradictory. To measure com-
munion, we construct a composite index that combines people’s emphasis on the family
and friends as important life domains, using VS questions V4 and V5, in which people are
asked to indicate the level of importance they ascribe to the family (V4) and friends (V5)
on a four-point scale from ‘‘not at all important’’ to ‘‘very important.’’ We average both
importance levels into a scale from 0 for someone attributing no importance to both family
and friends to 1.0 for someone attributing high importance to both. We interpret this scale
as measuring people’s communion emphasis. We will also use standard demographic
controls to make sure that the effects of our potentially satisfying factors are not con-
founded by sex, age, income and education.
7
6 Further readings include Peterson et al. (2005), Hagerty and Veenhoven (2006).
7 Biological sex is measured in V235 of the VS by observation of the interviewer. We coded female sex as
1.0 and male sex as 0. The age measure is taken from V237 of the VS and measures biological age in years.
Household income is measured in V253 on a scale of 1 to 10 for national income brackets. We transformed
this into a normalized scale with minimum 0 for the lowest and 1.0 for the highest income bracket. Level of
education is measured in V238 on a 9-point scale from 1 for no education whatsoever to 9 for a university
degree. We transformed this into a normalized scale with minimum 0 for the lowest level and 1.0 for the
highest level of education.
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123Based on the data and variables just described we test our three hypotheses on the
societal-level and the individual level. At both levels of analysis, the questions we try to
answer are (1) whether units of observation that are more advanced in cognitive mobili-
zation are also more advanced in self-expression values, (2) whether units of observation
that are more advanced in self-expression values follow a more agentic life strategy, and
(3) whether units of observation driven by a more agentic life strategy reach higher levels
of life satisfaction.
4 Findings
Table 2 shows the result of regressions when entire societies are the unit of analysis. The
table analyzes a society’s base level of self-expression values as a function of cognitive
mobilization and western traditions. Considered separately, both western traditions and
cognitive mobilization inﬂuence a society’s base level of self-expression values positively:
societies with stronger western traditions and cognitively mobilized societies exhibit
higher base levels of self-expression values. Under mutual controls, however, it turns out
that the self-expression effect of cognitive mobilization outperforms that of western tra-
ditions. Thus, the effect of cognitive mobilization is not contingent on western traditions:
even disconnected from these traditions does cognitive mobilization nurture self-expres-
sion values. In other words, cognitively mobilized societies are not more self-expressive
because they have stronger western traditions but because they are cognitively mobilized.
The scatterplot in Fig. 3 visualizes the utility-values link that ties self-expression values to
cognitive mobilization.
In social science there is always the possibility of the ‘ecological fallacy,’ which means
to mistakenly infer from macro-level linkages that the same linkages exist at the micro-
level (Robinson 1950; Alker 1969). Indeed many linkages that explain differences between
societies may not explain differences between individuals within societies (Przeworski and
Teune 1970). In this case, the macro-level linkages are ecological artifacts of aggregation
because they have no micro-foundation.
Table 3 examines the micro-foundation of the utility-value link, using a multi-level
model, often also referred to as a ‘hierarchical linear model’ (Bryk and Raudenbush 2002).
The coefﬁcients of the societal-level component of the model are not exactly identical to
those in the ecological regression models because missing data on some individual-level
variables reduce the sample from 83 to 78 societies. Still, we ﬁnd cognitive mobilization to
Table 2 Ecological regressions explaining self-expression values with cognitive mobilization
Predictors Dependent variable: self-expression values 1995–2005
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept .19 (9.79)*** .28 (13.89)*** .18 (9.77)***
Cognitive mobilization .38 (13.00)*** .32 (8.82)***
Western tradition .27 (7.63)*** .08 (2.61)*
Adjusted R
2 .67 .40 .69
N 83 87 83
Entries are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients with T-ratios in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels:
* p\.10; ** p\.01; *** p\.001
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123enhance the base level of self-expression values in a society more than double as much as
western traditions do. Looking at the individual-level ﬁndings, the model provides a nice
illustration of the utility logic. Education offers people greater opportunities to thrive
almost everywhere and so education should have a universally positive effect on self-
expression values, irrespective of societal-level conditions. This is indeed what we ﬁnd:
one’s level of education shows a generally positive and highly signiﬁcant effect on one’s
self-expression values, even taking societal-level variation of this effect into account. Yet,
the size of education’s self-expression effect is partially moderated by cognitive mobili-
zation at the societal-level: even though the effect of education is always positive, it tends
to be bigger in cognitively mobilized societies. This makes sense in the utility logic: in
cognitive mobilized societies, a larger number and greater diversity of occupations and
activities is available in which education pays off, and so education offers greater thriving
opportunities in cognitively mobilized societies. Education has greater utility for personal
growth in cognitively mobilized societies, which is reﬂected in a stronger effect on self-
expression values in such societies.
What about the values-strategy link that is supposed to tie agentic life strategies to self-
expression values? We understand agentic life strategies as a matter of degree: it is the
relative weight that feelings of agency have in shaping people’s life satisfaction. To
measure this weight, we calculate for each society the average strength by which people’s
feelings of agency impact on their life satisfaction, which becomes manifest in the mag-
nitude of the coefﬁcient that regresses life satisfaction on agency feelings. However, we are
Fig. 3 An illustration of the utility-value link
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123interested in the relative weight of feelings agency, as compared to the well-being effect of
monetary saturation whose materialist nature sets it in stark contrast to such an idealistic
aspect as agency. Thus, we calculate for each society how much stronger or weaker
people’s life satisfaction is shaped by agency feelings than by monetary saturation, sub-
tracting the well-being effect of monetary saturation from that of agency feelings. In other
words, we count the monetary against the agentic wellbeing effects and average these
differences over entire populations. This measures per society the relative strength of
agentic life strategies, which is the dependent variable in Table 4.
The regression results in Table 4 evidence the value-strategy link that is supposed to tie
agentic life strategies to self-expression values. This link is positive and highly signiﬁcant
and it does not break down under control of western traditions. It is by no means so that
agentic life strategies are tied to self-expression values only in western societies, as cultural
relativists might suspect. Put differently, agentic life strategies are not stronger in self-
expressive societies because these societies are more western but because they are more
self-expressive. A visual illustration of the value-strategy link is provided by the scatterplot
in Fig. 4.
As with the utility-value link, the value-strategy link has a micro-foundation too, and
quite in a Maslowian sense. For this matter consider that we can calculate for each
individual the residual in life satisfaction that is unexplained by this individual’s agency
feeling. This tells us how much a person’s satisfaction is unrelated to agency, which is a
directly inverse indicator of agency-driven satisfaction, that is, agentic life strategies. Now
guess what is the best individual-level predictor of someone’s agentic life strategy? The
answer is monetary saturation. Among those respondents in VS III to V whose life sat-
isfaction falls short of what their agency feelings predict (N = 112,487), monetary satis-
faction reduces the extent to which life satisfaction falls short of agency feelings in highly
signiﬁcant ways. Speciﬁcally, a one unit increase in monetary saturation decreases the
Table 3 Multi-level model
explaining self-expression
values
Entries are unstandardized
regression coefﬁcients with
T-ratios in parentheses.
Individual-level variables are
centered on society means;
society-level variables are
centered on the global mean.
Models calculated with HLM
6.01. Pooled data from WVS
rounds III (1995–1997) to V
(2005–2007). Signiﬁcance levels:
* p\.10; ** p\.01;
*** p\.001
Predictors Dependent variable:
self-expression values
1995–2005
Intercept .39 (53.63)***
Societal-level effects
Cognitive mobilization .27 (6.54)***
Western tradition .11 (3.27)***
Individual-level effects
Biological age -.01 (-10.70)***
Female sex .03 (14.48)***
Income level .05 (7.33)***
Education level .11 (17.88)***
Cognitive mobilization .11 (3.98)***
Western tradition Not signiﬁcant
Explained variances
Within-society variation of DV 10.3%
Between-society variation of DV 69.0%
Variation in effect of education 45.1%
N 149,887 Respondents
in 78 societies
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123extent to which life satisfaction falls short of agency by .26 units on a scale range from
-1.0 to ?1.0. This reduction operates in a conﬁdence interval between .25 and .27 units
and explains 13.7% of the total variation in agentic life strategies (or their inverse, to be
more precise). Counting out from this relationship the variation that is located between
societies, a one unit increase in monetary saturation reduces the extent to which life
satisfaction falls short of agency by .24 units, operating in a conﬁdence interval between
.244 and .235 units, still accounting for 10.2% of the total variation in agentic life
Table 4 Ecological regressions explaining the relative strength of agentic life strategies with self-
expression values
Predictors Dependent variable: relative strength of agentic life strategy 1995–2005
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept -.55 (-8.41)*** -.34 (-8.18)*** -.53 (8.02)***
Self-expression values .84 (5.45)*** .74 (3.60)***
Western tradition .27 (3.71)*** Not signiﬁcant
Adjusted R
2 .29 .16 .28
N 71 70 70
Entries are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients with T-ratios in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels:
* p\.10; ** p\.01; *** p\.001
Fig. 4 An illustration of the value-strategy link
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123strategies. Hence, material needs must be satisﬁed ﬁrst before agency can become the
driver of life satisfaction.
Let us now consider the strategy-wellbeing link that is supposed to tie the level of life
satisfaction to the strength of agentic life strategies. The regression analyses in Table 5 and
thescatterplotinFig. 5documentthatthislink,too,isstatisticallysigniﬁcant,operatesinthe
expected direction, and does not vanish when one takes the strength of a society’s western
traditionintoaccount.Thus,whenmorepeopleinasocietyfollowagenticlifestrategies,this
Fig. 5 An illustration of the strategy-wellbeing link
Table 5 Ecological regressions explaining life satisfaction with the relative strength of agentic life
strategies
Predictors Dependent variable: life satisfaction 1995–2005
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept .68 (41.64)*** .48 (24.77)*** .59 (21.16)***
Agentic life strategies .34 (5.89)*** .26 (4.43)***
Western tradition .27 (7.99)*** .16 (4.12)***
Adjusted R
2 .33 .42 .47
N 71 89 70
Entries are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients with T-ratios in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels:
* p\.10; ** p\.01; *** p\.001
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123society’s base live satisfaction level tends to be higher. And this relationship does not exist
becausesocietieswithstrongerwesterntraditionsnurturebothagenticlifestrategiesandhigh
levels of life satisfaction. These ﬁndings seem to indicate that even though various maxi-
mization strategies yield some level of satisfaction, certain strategies yield more than others.
Speciﬁcally, agentic strategies yield particularly high rates of life satisfaction.
Table 6 shows a multi-level model that examines the micro-foundation of the strategy-
wellbeing link. The societal-level component of the multi-level model corresponds to the
Table 6 Multi-level model
explaining life satisfaction
Entries are unstandardized
regression coefﬁcients with T-
ratios in parentheses. Individual-
level variables are centered on
society means; society-level
variables are centered on the
global mean. Models calculated
with HLM 6.01. Pooled data are
from WVS rounds III (1995–
1997), to V (2005–2007).
Signiﬁcance levels: * p\.10;
** p\.01; *** p\.001
Predictors Dependent variable:
life satisfaction
1995–2005
Intercept .59 (60.80)***
Societal-level effects
Agentic strategies (prevalence) .27 (4.58)***
Western tradition .17 (4.99)***
Individual-level effects
Biological age -.01 (-2.62)***
Female sex .01 (6.09)***
Income level .04 (7.18)***
Education level Not signiﬁcant
Communion emphasis .10 (6.69)***
Agentic strategies (prevalence) Not signiﬁcant
Western tradition Not signiﬁcant
Monetary saturation .53 (25.46)***
Agentic strategies (prevalence) -.41 (-3.30)***
Western tradition Not signiﬁcant
Agency feeling .21 (10.93)***
Agentic strategies (prevalence) .49 (3.34)***
Western tradition Not signiﬁcant
Agency 9 saturation -.06 (-4.38)***
Agentic strategies (prevalence) Not signiﬁcant
Western tradition Not signiﬁcant
Agency 9 communion Not signiﬁcant
Agentic strategies (prevalence) Not signiﬁcant
Western tradition Not signiﬁcant
Communion 9 saturation -.07 (-3.25)**
Agentic strategies (prevalence) Not signiﬁcant
Western tradition Not signiﬁcant
Explained variances
Within-society variation of DV 36.0%
Between-society variation of DV 47.6%
Variation in effect of communion 0%
Variation in effect of saturation 85.4%
Variation in effect of agency 55.1%
N 155,611 Respondents
in 76 societies
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123ﬁndings that we have seen in the ecological regressions, so the novelty is in the individual-
level component. Here we test the relative impact of three maximization strategies on
people’s life satisfaction, including (a) a communal strategy driven by communion
emphasis, (b) a monetary strategy driven by monetary saturation, and (c) an agentic
strategy driven by agency feelings. We are not only interested in the relative size of these
strategies’ general effects but also whether and in what direction these effects are mod-
erated by societal-level characteristics.
Apparently, each strategy contributes signiﬁcantly and positively to life satisfaction and
this is generally so, even taking societal-level moderations into account. Generally,
monetary saturation shows the strongest, agency feelings the second strongest, and com-
munion emphasis the third strongest effect on life satisfaction. In contrast to what much of
the psychological literature assumes (but see Baumeister et al. 2009), agency feelings and
communion emphasis are in no trade-off relation as strategies to maximize life satisfaction.
Otherwise, their interaction should be signiﬁcantly negative. In fact, however, it is sig-
niﬁcantly positive: agency feelings and communion emphasis amplify each others’ impact
on life satisfaction. But both strategies interact negatively with monetary saturation, which
indicates a trade-off relation: a decreasing impact of monetary saturation on life satis-
faction ampliﬁes the wellbeing effects of agency and communion, and vice versa. Looking
at moderations, the wellbeing effect of communion does not seem to vary with societal-
level characteristics but the effects of saturation and agency do, and they do so in a reverse
way. When many people in a society follow an agentic satisfaction strategy, an individual
Fig. 6 Changes in agency feelings and life satisfaction
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123yields much less satisfaction from more monetary saturation and more satisfaction from
stronger agency feelings. The positive moderation of agency’s individual-level effect by
the prevalence of agentic strategies at the societal-level illustrates a conﬁrmation mecha-
nism known as ‘social proof’ in psychology (Cialdini 1993): when many people in a
society follow agentic strategies one feels conﬁrmed when one does so oneself, which
increases agency’s satisfaction payoff.
In a dynamic perspective, our ﬁndings imply that rising feelings of agency bring rising
levels of life satisfaction. The evidence in Fig. 6 conﬁrms this expectation. The graphic
shows the extent and direction in which societies experienced changes in their overall
feelings of agency and in life satisfaction from the earliest to the latest available survey in
the VS. We delimit ourselves to changes that stretch over at least three rounds of the VS,
which implies a minimum temporal distance of 15 years. It is clear that changes in agency
feelings correspond with changes in life satisfaction. Controlling the initial level of life
satisfaction that was given right at the beginning of the changes depicted here does not
diminish the relationship.
5 Discussion
This article provided evidence for an evolutionary sequence of adaptive linkages that
anchor agency in the human motivational system. First, there is utility-value link through
which people learn to value the opportunities that have most utility under given existential
conditions. The logic of this link ties the rise of self-expression values to the thriving
opportunities that emerge with the cognitive mobilization of societies. Second, there is a
value-strategy link through which people translate their values into corresponding maxi-
mization strategies. This link ties the rise of agentic maximization strategies to the
emergence of self-expression values. Third, there is a strategy-wellbeing link that gives
different maximization strategies a differential satisfaction yield, in line with a Maslowian
logic due to which self-actualizing strategies yield the most satisfaction. This link ties high
levels of life satisfaction to agentic maximization strategies.
We see the strength of our evidence in its spatial scope and generality. We used
representative data that can be generalized to entire national populations and we covered a
wide, indeed global, range of societies at different levels of economic development and of
very different cultural roots. Insofar we can say that the evidence for the adaptive links we
have been showing is indeed broad and general. Also, we could show that the adaptive
links operate at different levels of analyses and that what we saw at the macro-level of
societies has a micro foundation among individuals. This further speaks to the validity of
our ﬁndings.
However, there is one serious limitation. Our evidence is mostly cross-sectional and
lacks a more extended longitudinal component. In lack of extensive longitudinal data it is
impossible to sort out what came ﬁrst and what followed, and so causality cannot be ﬁxed.
Without the means to test causality empirically, the causal direction in a proven rela-
tionship remains a matter of theoretical plausibility. Here we think we provide a model that
allows for some plausible causal interpretations that can be tested in the future. For this to
become possible, more longitudinal data must become available, even though some sup-
portive evidence is available already now. Speciﬁcally, Inglehart et al. (2008) have shown
that rising levels of happiness over the past 20 years in some 50 societies are related to an
increasing sense of freedom, which in turn is related to rising self-expression values. Yet,
these authors just report ﬁndings, without situating them in a broader theoretical
A Human Development Model 61
123framework from which to derive concise sets of testable hypotheses. The human devel-
opment framework provided here does formulate such sets of hypotheses and showed some
ﬁrst conﬁrmatory evidence. This evidence seems broad and deep enough to serve as a
starting point for further longitudinal and experimental studies into the links proposed here.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Social origins of democracy and dictatorship. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Alker, H. R., Jr. (1969). A typology of ecological fallacies. In M. Dogan & S. Rokkan (Eds.), Quantitative
ecological analysis in the social sciences (pp. 69–86). Cambridge: MIT.
Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review, 80, 1095–1111.
Bakan, D. (1966). The duality of human existence: An essay on psychology and religion. Boston: Beacon.
Barber, N. (2008). Evolutionary explanations for societal differences and historical change. Cross-Cultural
Research, 41, 123–148.
Baumeister, R. F., Masicampo, E. J., & DeWall, C. N. (2009). Prosocial beneﬁts of feeling free. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 260–268.
Birch, C., & Cobb, J. B., Jr. (1981). The liberation of life: From the cell to the community. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Boyd, R., & Richardson, P. J. (2005). How microevolutionary processes give rise to history. In R. Boyd & P.
J. Richardson (Eds.), The origin and evolution of cultures (pp. 287–309). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Bryk, A., & Raudenbush, S. (2002). Hierarchical linear models. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Carneiro, R. (2003). Evolutionism in cultural anthropology. Boulder: Westview.
Cialdini, R. B. (1993). Inﬂuence: Science and practice. New York: Harper Collins.
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dalton, R. J. (2006). Citizen politics. Washington, DC: PQ Press.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The what and why of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-
determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268.
Delhey, J. (2010). From material to postmaterial happiness? National afﬂuence and determinants of life
satisfaction in cross-national perspective. World Values Research, 2, 30–54.
Diamond, J. (2005). Collapse: How societies chose to fail or succeed. New York: Viking.
Diener, E., Lucas, R. E., & Scollon, C. N. (2006). Beyond the hedonic treadmill: Revising the adaptation
theory of well-being. American Psychologist, 61, 305–314.
Diener, E., & Oishi, S. (2000). Money and happiness: Income and subjective well-being across nations. In
E. Diener & E. Suh (Eds.), Subjective well-being across cultures. Cambridge: MIT.
Drucker, P. (1993). Post-capitalist society. New York: Harper Collins.
Dunbar, R., Knight, C., & Power, C. (1999). An evolutionary approach to human culture. In R. Dunbar,
C. Knight, & C. Power (Eds.), The evolution of culture (pp. 1–14). New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press.
Durham, W. H. (1991). Coevolution: Genes, culture, and human diversity. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Elias, N. (2004). Knowledge and power: An interview by Peter Ludes. In N. Stehr & V. Meja (Eds.), Society
& knowledge (pp. 203–242). New Brunswick: Transaction. [1984].
Flanagan, S. (1987). Value change in industrial society. American Political Science Review, 81, 1303–1319.
Flanagan, S., & Lee, A.-R. (2001). Value change and democratic reform in Japan and Korea. Comparative
Political Studies, 33, 626–659.
Florida, R. (2002). The rise of the creative class. New York: Basic Books.
Foerster, J., Higgins, E., & Idson, L. (1998). Approach and avoidance strength during goal attainment:
Regulatory focus and the ‘goal looms larger’ effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,
1115–1131.
Gerring, J., Bond, P., Barndt, W. T., & Moreno, C. (2005). Democracy and economic growth. World
Politics, 57, 323–364.
62 C. Welzel, R. Inglehart
123Guisinger, S., & Blatt, S. (1994). Individuality and relatedness. American Psychologist, 49, 104–111.
Hagerty, M., & Veenhoven, R. (2006). Rising happiness in nations, 1946–2004. A reply to Easterlin. Social
Indicators Research, 79, 421–436.
Haller, M., & Hadler, M. (2004). Happiness as an expression of freedom and self-determination: A com-
parative multilevel analysis. In W. Glatzer, S. von Below, & M. Stoffregen (Eds.), Challenges for
quality of life in the contemporary world. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Huntington, S. P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order. New York: Simon
& Schuster.
Inglehart, R. (1977). The silent revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43
societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R., Foa, R., Peterson, C., & Welzel, C. (2008). Development, freedom, and rising happiness.
Perspective on Psychological Science, 3, 264–285.
Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, cultural change and democracy: The human develop-
ment sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kluckhohn, C. (1951). Value and value orientation in the theory of action. In T. Parsons & E. Shils (Eds.),
Towards a general theory of action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lykken, D. (2000). Happiness, the nature and nurture of joy and contentment. New York: St. Martin’s
Grifﬁn.
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2000). Polity IV project (data users manual). College Park: University of
Maryland.
Maryanski, A., & Turner, J. H. (1992). The social cage: Human nature and the evolution of society.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Maslow, A. (1988). Motivation and personality (3rd ed.). New York: Harper & Row. [1954].
McAdams, D. P. (1993). The stories we live by. New York: Harper Collins.
Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G. M., & Ramirez, F. O. (1997). World society and the nation-state.
American Journal of Sociology, 103, 144–181.
Modelski, G., & Gardner, P. (2002). Democratization in long perspective. Technological Forecasting and
Social Change, 69, 359–376.
Nolan, P., & Lenski, G. (1999). Human societies (8th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill.
Parsons, T. (1964). Evolutionary universals in society. American Sociological Review, 29, 339–357.
Peterson, C., Park, N., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2005). Orientations to happiness and life satisfaction: The full
life versus the empty life. Journal of Happiness Studies, 6, 25–41.
Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1970). The logic of comparative social inquiry. New York: Wiley.
Reinert, E. S. (2007). How rich countries got rich … and why poor countries stay poor. New York: Carroll
& Graf.
Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological correlations and the behavior of individuals. American Sociological
Review, 15, 351–357.
Rokeach, M. (1968). Beliefs, attitudes and values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schwartz, S. H. (2007). Value orientations: Measurement, antecedents and consequences across nations. In
R. Jowell, C. Roberts, R. Fitzgerald, & G. Eva (Eds.), Measuring attitudes cross-nationally (pp. 161–
193). London: Sage.
Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Tofﬂer, A. (1990). Power shift: Knowledge, wealth and violence at the edge of the 21
st century. New York:
Bantham.
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2005). Evolutionary psychology: Conceptual foundations. In D. M. Buss (Ed.),
Evolutionary psychology handbook. New York: Wiley.
Veenhoven, R. (2000). Freedom and happiness: A comparative study in forty-four nations in the early
1990s. In E. Diener & E. Suh (Eds.), Subjective well-being across cultures (pp. 257–288). Cambridge:
MIT.
Warsh, D. (2006). Knowledge and the wealth of nations. New York: W.W. Norton.
Welzel, C. (2006). Democratization as an emancipative process. European Journal of Political Research,
45, 871–896.
Welzel, C. (2007). Do levels of democracy depend on mass attitudes? International Political Science
Review, 28, 397–424.
Welzel, C., Inglehart, R., & Klingemann, H. D. (2003). The theory of human development: A cross-cultural
analysis. European Journal of Political Research, 42, 341–379.
A Human Development Model 63
123